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Abstract 
To help answer questions about availability, accessibility, sustainability and other 
dimensions of energy security, the vulnerability approach concentrates the attention of 
policymakers on the assessment of risks associated with natural, technical, political and 
economic factors. This understanding, combined with a focus on energy services (e.g. 
lighting, heating, telecommunications, mobility, etc.) helps to prioritize actions to achieve 
the goal of energy security.  This paper conceptualizes energy security as low vulnerability 
of vital energy systems and sustained provision of modern energy services. Taking 
Tajikistan as a case, this paper highlights key vulnerabilities including neglect of 
environmental conditions, insufficient energy production capacity, unreliable and 
expensive energy imports, dwindling power infrastructure causing technical and economic 
losses, inadequate transparency in the power sector, lack of regional cooperation in energy 
and water resources sharing, and inadequate financial resources to address these 
challenges. Three major proposals presented by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program, and the Government of Tajikistan to achieve energy security in 
Tajikistan are evaluated. Specifically, they lack a focus on energy services and therefore 
overlook people's socio-cultural context and appropriate energy needs. This paper 
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highlights energy services as critical to people’s wellbeing and socio-economic 
development. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy security is a complex and evolving concept (Ang et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2014; 
Cherp and Jewell, 2014; Hughes, 2009a; Löschel et al., 2010; Månsson et al., 2014; Sovacool, 
2013; Sovacool and Mukherjee, 2011; Vivoda, 2010; Winzer, 2012). Based on our review of 
the literature (Laldjebaev et al., 2016), and in agreement with Cherp & Jewel (2014) and 
Cherp et al. (2012), we adopt the following working definition of energy security: low 
vulnerability of vital energy systems and sustained provision of modern energy services. The 
vulnerability approach offers several advantages over conventional dimensions approaches 
(e.g. “4As” by Kruyt et al., 2009, “4Rs” by Hughes, 2009b1)  to energy security assessment. 
Firstly, the definition captures the various dimensions (e.g. availability, affordability, 
sustainability, etc.) of energy security that are outcomes of reduced vulnerability of energy 
systems arising from four major risk factors: “natural (e.g., resource scarcity, extreme 
natural events), technical (e.g., aging of infrastructure, technological accidents), political 
(e.g., intentional restriction of supplies or technologies, sabotage and terrorism), and 
economic (e.g., high or volatile prices)” (Cherp et al., 2012, p. 330). Secondly, along with 
                                                        
1 We will not discuss these approaches for they have been critiqued in detail by Cherp & Jewel (2014). 
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exposure to risk, the resilience of energy systems is also considered. Thirdly, flexibility of 
application in diverse contexts allows for “(a) delineating vital energy systems; (b) 
exploring their vulnerabilities; and (c) understanding the political process which leads to 
the prioritization of certain energy systems and vulnerabilities” (Cherp and Jewell, 2014, p. 
418). Finally, it grounds the assessment on provision of modern energy services, which is 
the ultimate rationale for energy security policies.  
Based on Practical Action’s (2014) work, energy services2 can be conceptualized as 
energy relative to services that it can provide to people. Energy needs, then, are framed as a 
range of services that can be provided by tapping on different energy sources. As such, 
energy needs/services are stratified in terms of their immediacy to basic survival 
necessities of people: for households, for earning a living, and for community. 
 Using a novel vulnerability approach, this paper assesses threats and responses to 
Tajikistan’s energy system, and it applies an analytical lens, using the four risk factors 
(natural, technical, political, economic) to reveal critical shortcomings that can be 
detrimental to energy security if not addressed adequately. Massive shortages of key 
energy carriers, such as electricity, natural gas, and fuel, such as gasoline and diesel, have 
crippled efforts aimed at achieving greater prosperity for the people of Tajikistan. 
Alleviation of such energy shortages and providing “reliable and high quality access to 
energy for the entire population, for industries and services, and to ensure the efficient use 
of energy in order to reduce poverty” are the main objectives of energy security in 
                                                        
2 This concept is reviewed by Fell (2017) who finds a distinction between the desired end service or state and 
the energy service used to provide it, and formulates a new definition: “Energy services are those functions 
performed using energy which are means to obtain or facilitate desired end services or states.” The PPEO 
2014 approach is in line with Fell’s (2017) finding and definition.  
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Tajikistan (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2010, p. 11). To achieve this goal, three major 
proposals have been advanced by the World Bank (Fields et al., 2013), the United Nations 
Development Program (Bukarica et al., 2011; Morvaj et al., 2010a, 2010b), and the 
Government of Tajikistan (“Open Joint Stock Company ‘Rogun HPP,’” n.d., “Rogun HPP,” 
n.d.)3. Although these proposals are dated (2013, 2010/11 and 2008 respectively), they 
represent the existing options because no new alternatives to energy policy have been 
proposed. At stake is people’s wellbeing, and therefore, it is important to assess their 
contribution to achieving energy security in Tajikistan. An evaluation of these proposals 
shows that they overlook the complexity of the energy needs and the role of local 
communities in addressing their energy priorities. As a way to remedy these shortcomings, 
we will recommend an alternative approach to energy security, namely the energy services 
approach based on Practical Action’s (2014) work. This approach requires a refocus from 
energy sources to services, which helps avoid the trap of accounting for energy stocks at the 
expense of meeting people’s needs. Such a paradigm shift, facilitated by combining a 
vulnerability and energy services approaches, will inform effective policy to achieve energy 
security. 
 
                                                        
3 Abbreviations: CAPS – Central Asian Power System; CASA-1000 – Central Asia South Asia Electricity 
Transmission and Trade Project; CHP – Combined Heat and Power (plant); EDB – Eurasian Development 
Bank; EE – Energy Efficiency; GBAO – Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast; GDP – Gross Domestic Product; 
GW – Gigawatt; GWh – Gigawatt hour; HPP – Hydropower Plant; ICT – Information and Communication 
Technology; IEA – International Energy Agency; km – kilometer; km2 – square kilometer; km3 – cubic 
kilometer; ktoe – kiloton of oil equivalent; kW – kilowatt; kWh – kilowatt hour; MW – Megawatt; NGO – Non-
governmental Organization; PPEO – Poor People’s Energy Outlook; PV – Photovoltaic; RES – Renewable 
Energy Sources; RFE-RL – Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty; sHPPs – small-scale Hydropower Plants; TALCO – 
Tajik Aluminum Company; TPES – Total Primary Energy Supply; UNDP – United Nations Development 
Program. 
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2. An overview of energy security in Tajikistan  
This section provides an overview of the energy situation in Tajikistan by taking 
stock of energy sources and analyzing energy production and consumption patterns. This 
analysis provides the necessary context, in which to place the subsequent evaluation of 
energy security options provided in the following section.  
2.1. National supply 
For those unfamiliar with the country, the total primary energy supply (TPES) for 
Tajikistan in 2012 equaled 2,805 kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe) and was comprised of 
hydropower (47.2%), oil (30.3%), coal (13.4%) and natural gas (9.1%) (IEA, 2014a). 
According to Musayeva et al. (2009), hydro resources in Tajikistan hold a substantial 
power generation potential that is estimated at 527 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh), but 
technical potential is 317 billion kWh, or 60% per year. This ranks Tajikistan eighth in the 
world (EDB, 2008), second in electricity per capita worldwide (Fakirov, 2012), and first in 
the world in its hydropower potential. For hydrocarbons, the endowments for coal are 
estimated at about 4.452 billion tons, for gas, 8.517 trillion cubic meters, and for oil, 117.6 
million tons (Musayeva et al., 2009). Recent reports of discovery of large reserves in the 
Bokhtar region of Tajikistan claim as much as 114 trillion cubic feet of gas and 8.5 billion 
barrels of oil (Collins and White, 2013). Recoverable oil potential is estimated at 27 billion 
barrels (EurasiaNet, 2012). However, domestic production only meets 16% of the national 
demand for coal, 4.7% of the demand for oil, and 5.4% of the demand for gas (Musayeva et 
al., 2009, p. 4).  
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The historical record of energy supply (Figure 1), shows that Tajikistan’s energy 
supply was highest in pre-1990 period, when it was part of the Soviet Union, and supply 
was relatively balanced among sources. A sharp decline occurred during the early 1990s, 
after the break-up of the Soviet Union and ensuing civil war in Tajikistan that devastated 
the economy in a matter of a few years. After signing the peace and reconciliation act in 
1997, and in the first decade of 2000, overall supply levels fluctuated around 2,500 ktoe, 
and more recently exhibited an upward trend.  The energy mix, however, gradually shifted, 
with gas supply, once accounting for a larger share in the mix, decreasing over time. 
Concurrently, oil supply has shown a slight upward trend, owing to increased imports to 
power a greater number of private vehicles. The supply of coal also has made a gradual 
comeback due to demand for heating and use in combined heat and power (CHP) plants. 
Likewise, the share of hydropower supply has increased since mid-1990s to compensate 
for the reduction in the share of other fuels.  
[Figure 1 here] 
According to the Ministry of Energy and Industry of Tajikistan (2007; see also 
Musayeva et al., 2009), hydropower plants claim over 90% of the total installed electricity 
generation capacity in Tajikistan, with the remainder provided by thermal power plants. 
The Nurek Hydropower Plant (HPP) is the backbone of the energy sector in Tajikistan, 
generating 3,000 megawatts (MW), or over 60% of all installed hydropower capacity. Other 
significant plants include Sangtuda-1 HPP (670 MW) and Baipaza HPP (600 MW). However, 
installed capacities are not fully utilized because their availability depends on river flows 
and effective demand. An estimated 71-81% of the capacity is available, and only 53-68% is 
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actually operating on average. According to Fields et al. (2013), operating capacity is lowest 
in winter due to reduced river flows, with an estimated total firm capacity4 of 2,250 MW, 
which is 47% of peak load demand. Winter flows affect small hydropower plants even 
worse due to the absence of water storage facilities, and the firm capacity drops down to 
25% of installed capacity in this season.  
Winter shortages, due to lower river flows and reduced hydropower production, 
along with an increased demand for heating, and lack of affordable alternative energy 
sources, create a deficit between supply and demand that results in load shedding. 
According to Fields et al. (2013), the size of unmet demand for electricity was estimated at 
about 2,700 gigawatt-hours (GWh), or 24% of total electricity demand in 2012. The 
associated economic losses from electricity shortages are estimated at over $200 million, 
or 3% of GDP every year. Social costs also arise from burning wood and coal, which cause 
indoor air pollution and are often insufficient to maintain adequately warm temperatures 
in homes and schools. This can adversely impact human health, particularly for women and 
children. Without a solution, winter demand is expected to exceed 15,000 GWh by 2020, 
and 45% will not be met, exacerbating hardships that people endure each winter (Fields et 
al., 2013). 
2.2. Regional energy trade 
The five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – have substantial natural resources, including land, water, 
                                                        
4 “firm capacity is taken to be the available capacity in January—the month of peak demand, even though, from a 
purely hydrological point of view, available capacity is lowest in March, when flows are lowest” (Fields et al., 2013, 
p. 29). 
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oil, gas, and mineral resources. As the highlights in Table 1 indicate, over 90% of fossil fuels 
are found in the territories of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, whereas over 90% of the 
hydropower potential rests with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Sharma et al., 2004). The 
difference in resource distribution hints at mutually beneficial cooperation in resources 
sharing.  As part of Soviet Union, the upstream republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
exported hydroelectricity during summer to downstream republics of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, which compensated their upstream neighbors during winter with coal, gas and 
electricity, produced at thermal power plants (Sharma et al., 2004). Tajikistan produced 
about 40% and imported 60% of its energy in 1990 (IEA, 2014b).   
[Table 1 here] 
Following disintegration of the Soviet Union, the countries began to shift in the 
political-economic domain away from centralized rule and command economy towards 
independence and market relations, which led to deterioration of regional energy sharing 
mechanism. Electricity trade was adversely affected; imports fell by 56%, from 3.9 billion 
kWh in 1990 to 1.7 billion kWh in 2000, and exports plunging by 85% in the same period 
(Sharma et al., 2004). Since 2008, piped gas supply from Uzbekistan, the sole supplier 
accounting for about 95%, decreased significantly (Figure 1), because of overdue payments 
(Khashim, 2009), and  stopped altogether at the end of 2012 due to disagreement over its 
import price (Swinkels, 2014). The Central Asia Power System (CAPS) that transmitted 
1,500 GWh of electricity was severed in 2009 (Fields et al., 2013), following disputes over 
each countries’ share of electricity. The significant reduction in electricity trade meant that 
Tajikistan had to struggle through cold winters without adequate power supply. Not only 
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did the economy suffer, but extreme hardships were imposed on the population. The 
relations further strained when Tajikistan resumed construction of Rogun HPP5 to meet 
winter demand (Shahbazov, 2017). However, the summer excess hydropower capacity in 
Tajikistan, thus, remains mostly idle. The loss to the economy of idle discharge of water 
from power plants is estimated between $90 and $225 million a year (Fakirov, 2012). To 
remedy the situation, Tajikistan looked south to Afghanistan and north to Kyrgyzstan for 
energy cooperation. In 2016, exports to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan were 1.3 billion and 
0.1 billion kWh respectively, comprising 8% of total electricity generated in Tajikistan 
(AsiaPlus, 2017). The export capacity is to expand through the Central Asia South Asia 
Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) – a $1.7 billion investment in 
power transmission lines and convertor stations (World Bank, 2016) to channel 1000-
1300 MW of electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(“CASA-1000 Project: List of FAQs,” 2011). In short, the ups and downs in regional 
cooperation present additional challenges to energy planners to optimize energy systems 
locally but also regionally.  
2.3. National consumption  
Industrial consumption of electricity more than doubled from 4.6 to 11.2 billion 
kWh in the decade of 1980s, when Tajikistan was part of the Soviet Union (Figure 2). The 
increase was associated with the completion of the Nurek HPP, with 3,000 MW installed 
capacity, along with rising demand from the aluminum smelting plant (now known as Tajik 
                                                        
5 The Rogun HPP was started 1976 but construction halted after collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 2004, 
a Russian aluminum company (RUSAL) agreed to complete construction but withdrew in 2007. Following a 
harsh winter energy crisis, in 2008/2009, the Government of Tajikistan announced resumption of 
construction that continues to date.  
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Aluminum Company, or TALCO) which expanded production, reaching a maximum of 
457,000 metric tons in 1988 (TALCO, n.d.). Other large industrial projects, including a 
nitric-fertilizer plant in Vakhsh town, a chemical plant in Yavan town, and a cement plant in 
Dushanbe city also contributed to the surge in electricity consumption (TALCO, n.d.). 
Following independence from the Soviet Union, and subsequent political turmoil and 
through the 1990s, industrial production collapsed and its share of electricity consumption 
fell off from 60% to 35% of the country’s total. Much was due to a reduction in aluminum 
production by about 40% from its peak. Simultaneously, electricity generation decreased 
from 18 billion to 14 billion kWh by the 1995-1998 due to (a) halting of Yavan Thermal 
Electric Power Plant that lacked fuel and maintenance, and (b) reduction of hydropower 
output potential because of silting at Nurek HPP, along with closing several plants because 
of lack of spare parts and adequate maintenance (Sharma et al., 2004).  
[Figure 2 here] 
The use of electricity for agriculture was on the rise from 1980 to 1994, but then 
gradually declined, until 2010, after which it has steadily increased. During the first period 
of increase, the operation of Nurek HPP provided more electricity for water pumping 
stations and also made more water available for irrigation, owing to its large reservoir 
capacity (10.5 km3 – full and 3.2 km3 – useful volume) (Barki Tojik, n.d.). Indeed, the 
primary function of Nurek HPP was to store water during the non-vegetative season and 
release it for irrigation during the growing season. Electricity production was considered a 
useful bi-product (Fields et al., 2013). The subsequent decline was related to a reduction in 
electricity output and reduced allocation to the agricultural sector because TALCO began to 
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recover and increased its consumption of electricity (TALCO, n.d.). Additionally, ageing 
agricultural infrastructure, lack of spare parts, and access to fuels to run agricultural 
machinery contributed to lower electricity demand. More importantly, , agricultural reform 
in Tajikistan introduced a series of dramatic changes regarding the use of land (Lerman & 
Sedik, 2009). Large unprofitable farms (kolkhoz and sovkhoz6) were restructured into a 
new form of organization called dekhkan (peasant) farm, which were of three types: 
individual, family, and collective (“partnerships”). The changes did not improve efficiency 
of the farms, because they continued to function like their predecessors. However, the 
decrease in land area sown to cotton likely resulted in reduced electricity consumption. 
Because cotton is water-intensive, less cotton sown meant less water pumped, and thus, 
less power consumed.  
Household (residential) consumption of electricity gradually grew from 1980 to 
2014. Between 2008 and 2009, there was a sharp drop in consumption. This was a time of 
severe energy crisis, with extremely low temperatures and heavy snowfall in winter, 
coupled with disruption of electricity imports from Turkmenistan, and gas imports from 
Uzbekistan. Electricity was rationed at 2 hours a day for rural consumers, while in the 
capital city, blackouts stretched to 9 hours a day. Households were desperate for wood, 
coal, paper boxes, and other materials to cook their food outdoors and stay warm by the 
fire. Offices were closed, surgeries suspended, and water supply was disrupted when pipes 
burst under the pressure of cold. In addition, maternity hospitals reported the tragic death 
of newborns (Laldjebaev, 2010). This was by far the greatest evidence of the failure of the 
                                                        
6 Kolkhoz – from “kolektivnoe khozyaistvo” meaning “collective farm”; Sovkhoz – from “sovetskoe khozyaistvo” 
meaning “soviet farm”. 
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resource sharing mechanism since the countries’ independence, underscoring the 
deteriorating relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Since 2010 the situation has 
become exacerbated by the debate over water and electricity, particularly revolving around 
Tajikistan’s proposed, contentious Rogun HPP project.  
The spatial distribution of electricity consumption reveals that Dushanbe city 
dwellers use a substantially larger share than rural households, likely because electricity in 
the city is the sole energy source to satisfy primary needs of lighting, cooking and heating. 
In contrast, rural households resort to using solid biomass for cooking and heating needs in 
the absence of electricity. For all of Tajikistan, the seasonal pattern of consumption follows 
the availability of electricity dictated by the nature of hydropower production. 
Other factors contribute to issues of affordability and equity, and in determining 
levels of consumption, including tariffs and electricity losses. Although tariffs (Figure 3) are 
considered among the lowest in Europe and Central Asia (Fields et al., 2013; Swinkels, 
2014), residential consumers (1.9 US cents/kWh) are charged the second highest price 
after commercial consumers (4.9 US cents/kWh) , while pumped irrigation (0.7 US 
cents/kWh) and TALCO (1.1 US cents/kWh) are charged less than households 
(Chorshanbiev, 2017). The tariffs may be low compared to other countries, but they are not 
affordable, especially for rural households (comprising 70% of the population) who spend 
an average of 10-15% of their income on energy, and the poor and extreme poor spend a 
whopping 19-24% (Swinkels, 2014). To cope with high energy expenses, households save 
money on food, clothes, reduce electricity use, live in one room, and rely on biomass – 
which adversely impacts their wellbeing (Swinkels, 2014).  In addition, there are sizable 
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electricity losses, on par with overall household consumption. This is partly due to ageing 
energy infrastructure (Ergashev et al., 2013) and energy-intensive production of aluminum 
at TALCO. The other part is due to economic losses in terms of low tariffs, low collections 
and chronic indebtedness of the state-owned electricity utility, Barki Tojik (Fields et al., 
2013; Swinkels, 2014). Inequity is heightened by winter energy shortages, which have now 
become a pattern, due to the seasonality of hydropower plants. To get out of this cycle, the 
government of Tajikistan is aiming to build new power plants, and upgrade existing ones.  
[Figure 3 here] 
2.4. Energy security and vulnerability  
The prospects for achieving energy security in Tajikistan depend, in part, on the 
country’s energy system vulnerabilities, especially within the two major sectors of the 
energy system: electricity and fuel (including coal, oil and gas). Key vulnerabilities of the 
energy system in Tajikistan are revealed using the four risk factors (Table 2).  
[Table 2 here] 
The government of Tajikistan has taken steps to address these vulnerabilities, 
including plans and projects to build small, medium and large hydropower plants for 
domestic demand, but also to sell power abroad. As discussed, existing thermal power 
plants are switching to coal, and new ones are under construction, primarily aiming to 
provide for heating needs in the winter.  Development of new coalmines is also proposed 
and discovery of potentially large resources of natural gas and oil is attracting attention for 
further exploration and seismic surveys. International players are also involved, but the 
prospects of actual extraction remain uncertain. For the short term, fuel imports are likely 
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to remain as a primary option in powering the transportation and industry sectors. 
Increases in electricity tariffs in July 2014 and again in November 2016 are aimed at 
achieving greater efficiency and bolstering financial sustainability of electricity sector. Yet, 
affordability of tariffs for the households and small businesses remains uncertain. 
Viewing the government responses through the vulnerability lens, it is evident that 
most efforts are concentrated on addressing the technical and partly economic factors, 
mainly through expanding domestic production capacity and tariff increases. Other factors 
remain largely unaddressed. Current national policy falls far short of securing energy 
access in rural areas of Tajikistan, and rural households remain vulnerable to energy 
shortages, and the related negative consequences of energy poverty. 
 
3.  Energy security in practice: moving beyond traditional pathways  
Three sets of options, or pathways, for achieving energy security in Tajikistan have 
been presented by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the 
Government of Tajikistan.  Weighing the different plans through the lens of risks and 
vulnerabilities highlights a collection of advantages and shortcomings of each plan and 
creates a foundation for an alternative way to provide energy security based on a new 
conceptual framework of energy services (Practical Action 2014), discussed in the next 
section. 
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3.1. The World Bank pathway: efficiency, thermal supply and trade  
The electricity system in Tajikistan “is in a state of crisis”, claimed a recent World 
Bank report7 (Fields et al., 2013). In an attempt to address the crisis situation, the World 
Bank study identifies a range of measures that could bridge the energy gap and put the 
country on the path towards long-term energy security. The actions are grouped under 
four categories: energy efficiency, investment preparation, trade promotion, and energy 
policy.  
Energy efficiency measures include a pricing mechanism, particularly an increase in 
average tariff from $0.0225 in 2012 to $0.07 per kWh of electricity consumed by 2025. A 
sizeable contribution to efficiency also comes from reducing losses in transmission and 
distribution networks, estimated at around 18%. Further savings would come from 
implementation of energy efficiency measures at TALCO, along with switching from 
electricity-based to coal-based (and subsequently to gas-based) heat supply to urban 
households via centralized district heating systems. These efficiencies could yield about 
20% reduction in electricity demand.  
Investing in new generation capacity through building of three new thermal power 
plants (3,200 GW) and Sanobad run-of-river hydropower plant (500 GW) could also curb 
winter demand by 25%. Both thermal and hydropower plants require substantial 
investment of about $2.8 billion, and funding is required to maintain existing hydropower 
capacity, particularly to rehabilitate the Nurek HPP. Undoubtedly, a sound investment plan 
is needed to manage the large amount of capital required for the proposed actions.  
                                                        
7 Unless otherwise indicated, all data in subsection 3.1. are taken from the World Bank report. 
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Simultaneously, revitalizing the energy trade with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
and expanding trade with Afghanistan could lead to greater energy security. To begin, 
plugging back in to the Central Asia Power System (CAPS) is technically as easy as 
reconnecting the lines that previously transmitted around 1,500 GWh of electricity to cover 
winter energy need in Tajikistan. Moreover, Tajikistan would be able to sell more of its 
summer surplus to Afghanistan, and even Pakistan, as envisaged by the Central Asia South 
Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000). Along with electricity trade, 
imports of natural gas from Uzbekistan, which were halted in 2012, could be reinstated and 
even expanded given the gas trunk line capacity of 7 billion cubic meters. To resume 
imports, mutually agreeable terms on price and delivery schedules are necessary.  
Combining all of the above measures under a robust energy policy is arguably the 
most important action proposed in the study. Such a well-rounded policy would balance 
domestic energy needs with export and import potential, so foreign exchange can be 
earned, while every home remains powered. In this balance the role of new power plants, 
both thermal and hydro, would be adequately laid out so that the need for power is met 
economically according to acceptable social and environmental standards. With potentially 
promising reserves of domestic natural gas, the way forward would be to accelerate 
exploration efforts. In addition, rates would be affordable, and social safety nets designed 
as necessary. In economic terms, these measures would cost over $3.4 billion, requiring an 
average of about $380 million annually from 2012 to 2020. In this plan, about half of the 
financing goes to addition of new capacity, with rehabilitation accounting for a third, and 
the remainder going to efficiency and construction of power export transmission lines. To 
put the figures in perspective, the investment required makes up about 5% of the average 
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GDP annually. All in all, the proposed actions signify major changes to the energy system of 
Tajikistan, carrying the hope of greater energy security. 
The World Bank’s plan to resolve the winter energy crisis is compelling; however, 
several issues need addressing. As the study recognizes, costs represent the most 
significant financial risk and would require careful consideration of tariff policies, private 
sector involvement and donor assistance, as well as potential earnings from power exports 
to mitigate the risks (Fields et al., 2013). Additionally, social and environmental costs also 
would require mitigation.  
Tariff increases proposed in the plan, although estimated to be in line with 
consumers’ willingness to pay, would be difficult to implement. The study estimated annual 
increases at around 11%, between 2014 and 2025, but such an increase would further 
impact already strained household budgets. Against a background of severe energy 
shortages increases would create additional burden, particularly for the poorer consumers, 
unless a safety mechanism is designed and properly enforced. Tariff increases also have 
serious political implications. For example, in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, increases in utility 
rates played a major role in massive protests that allegedly led to overthrowing of the 
government on April 8, 2010 (Kramer, 2010).  
Similarly, private sector involvement in the energy sector would face difficulties, 
requiring substantial effort to improve the overall business climate in the country. 
According to Ease of Doing Business report in 2013, Tajikistan ranked 143 out of 189 
economies worldwide, which is much lower than neighboring Kyrgyzstan (68), although 
they are similar in population, geography and resource endowments (World Bank, 2013). 
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Complicated procedures to start a business coupled with myriad regulations increase costs 
and uncertainties, thus deterring entrepreneurs and investors to enter the energy market. 
The experiences of foreign-owned Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2 HPP with non-payments, 
and lack of private investments in Rogun HPP (except the forced purchase of shares by 
population) are prominent examples of unfavorable business conditions.  
Indeed, export potential of electricity is high during the summer months when river 
flows are high and surplus is generated at hydropower plants. However, since Tajikistan’s 
electricity network was severed from the CAPS in 2009 the summer excess capacity 
remains mostly idle. Only a small fraction is exported to Afghanistan. The recommended 
reconnection to and revitalization of electricity trade among Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan would be very difficult especially in light of poor political relations with 
Uzbekistan, particularly stemming from fierce opposition to the construction of Rogun HPP. 
Notably, the climate of tense relations was a contributing factor to halting of gas supplies 
from Uzbekistan in 2012.   
Given the dim prospects of regional energy trade, domestic resources of coal 
become attractive. The proposal for fuel-switching to coal-based heating, however, brings 
with it increased emissions and air pollution and associated health and environmental 
impacts. The Dushanbe-2 thermal power plant considered in the World Bank study was 
inaugurated on January 10, 2014. Many had raised concerns over negative impacts on the 
environment and human health, given the plant’s location within 2 km of a residential area, 
a children’s amusement park, and botanical gardens. Authorities assured that the plant 
would make use of modern, clean and efficient technologies that reportedly capture 
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hazardous emissions to 99.8%. However, soon after operation, reports emerged of citizens 
complaining about a thick layer of coal dust on their property and black soot spoiling 
laundry hung outside (AsiaPlus, 2014; Kalybekova, 2014; Sodiqov, 2014). Following the 
early complaints, plant operation was stopped for 24 hours, after which the issue was 
dismissed as a one-time release. Although particulate matter may be better captured with 
improved filters, emissions that are not easily traceable (e.g. CO2, SOx, NOx and mercury) 
would be much harder to deal with. The associated social and environmental costs from 
these emissions could counter the benefits of warmth and comfort for city residents. 
Furthermore, these costs could exacerbate the financial impact of increased tariffs on 
household budgets.  
TALCO may be able to implement some of the efficiency measures; however, the 
shifting of maintenance to wintertime may not be technically feasible due to specificity of 
aluminum production processes. Moreover, the company may be constrained by its long-
term contracts with suppliers of raw materials and buyers of manufactured products. 
These actors determine the time and volume of production that may conflict with the 
suggested transfer of repair works from summer to winter. To date, there is no indication 
of any such actual measures put in place by the company.  
In short, the proposed plan for addressing winter energy shortages identifies some 
important aspects of energy policy in Tajikistan. The extent to which the proposed 
solutions are feasible is subject to debate, because they partly address technical and 
economic but underestimate political and ignore natural risk factors.  
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3.2. The UNDP pathway: affordable renewable energy for rural and vulnerable 
households  
The United Nations Development Program prepared a set of three documents that 
address energy sector challenges in Tajikistan and propose solutions towards “ensuring 
reliable and affordable energy supply as a main prerequisite for enhanced economic 
development and reduction of poverty” (Bukarica et al., 2011, p. 2). The foci of these 
documents are: to deploy renewable energy sources (RES), and to improve energy 
efficiency (EE). The financial mechanism to implement the proposed measures is identified 
as the National Fund for RES and EE.  
In the first document, the Intermediate Strategy (Morvaj et al., 2010a), priority is 
given to community-based small-scale hydropower plants (sHPPs); solar energy, in terms 
of thermal collectors and photovoltaic devices; and some low cost energy efficiency 
measures. The second document, the National Program (Morvaj et al., 2010b), makes a case 
for nation-wide scaling up of the measures proposed in the Intermediate Strategy. The 
program would reach 100,000 vulnerable households, providing each with access to a 
minimum of 1 kW of electricity8. Installation of sHPPs that produce 200 MW for the 
duration of the program, until 2020, would require an estimated $110 million. For social 
institutions, including hospitals, schools and kindergartens, installation of solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal systems (for hot water) is recommended in this plan. 
The third document, the Energy Efficiency Master Plan (Bukarica et al., 2011), 
proposes a range of policy measures to strengthen the legal and regulatory standards of 
                                                        
8 Unless otherwise indicated, all data in subsection 3.2 is taken from three UNDP documents. 
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energy use, as well as institutional capacities to oversee implementation of energy 
efficiency activities. The plan includes actions to revitalize district heating systems and 
curb transmission and distribution losses, thus improving energy supply. At the demand 
side, the actions address various aspects, ranging from building codes, to energy equipment 
standards, to energy audits, training and education, and metering and billing. Other 
efficiency measures include insulation of buildings by using local resources (straw and 
cane), technologies (lathing and furring), installation of double glazed windows, and 
improving cooking/heating stoves. Energy savings from this plan gained by 2020 are 
estimated up to 895 GWh equivalent to 3.6% of Tajikistan’s total final energy consumption 
in 2011. 
Solar energy would require at least a $50 million investment, with an additional 
$1.65 million for efficiency measures until 2020. Total costs for the sHPPs, solar energy, 
and efficiency measures were estimated at over $162 million for the period from 2010 to 
2020. To provide for the suggested measures, the UNDP plan proposes establishment of the 
National Trust Fund for Renewable Energy Sources and Energy Efficiency in Tajikistan. 
This is a financial instrument that acts as an intermediary between energy producers 
(small-scale community based hydropower plants) and the utility (Barki Tojik) that 
essentially bridges the price differential between an incentive price guaranteed to the 
producer and the average system price of electricity. In essence, the system operator pays 
an average price to the Fund for electricity from the power producer, who receives a higher 
than average price from the Fund. During off-grid operation, the Fund also acts as 
intermediary between the RES power producer and final consumers – guaranteeing 
incentive price to the producer.  
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The three strategic documents produced by the UNDP propose some reasonable 
solutions towards achieving energy security through small-scale technologies and energy 
efficiency initiatives that would stimulate local economic development activity and reduce 
poverty in rural areas of Tajikistan. This proposal has many merits, but several key issues 
require further consideration.   
The crux of the energy plan is development of sHPPs, and their connection to the 
national electricity grid. Tajikistan’s mountainous landscapes and availability of streams 
and rivers make this plan attractive. However, the proposal does not examine the potential 
for hydropower production in terms of availability of sufficient river flow in wintertime. 
Furthermore, there is no spatial analysis to identify where this potential could be realized. 
Resource availability does not always coincide with population centers and proximity to 
where electricity is needed is a major criterion for making sHPPs successful; the farther 
away the plant, the larger the losses in transmission (and distribution). Generation capacity 
also has to match the demand for energy in the service area. In theory, connection to the 
grid would be advantageous when energy supply from individual sHPPs exceed or fall short 
of demand. However, given the seasonal nature of electricity generation in the country, 
with system-wide surpluses during high flows and shortages during low flows, connection 
to the grid may actually offer little advantages.  The grid will not offer a cushion because 
both small and large-scale hydropower plants follow the same production pattern. It would 
have been advantageous, had the grid been backed up by coal or natural gas fired power 
plants. 
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The program of national scale-up, as proposed in the UNDP documents, is indeed 
germane to addressing energy needs and improving the living conditions of approximately 
1 million of the most vulnerable people in rural areas. The scale-up scenario, however, is 
based on a single project that was implemented in Vahdat district, in the outskirts of the 
capital city of Dushanbe. This raises questions regarding the applicability of the project 
experience to other communities. Importantly, it is not specified whether the pilot project 
was able to cover the energy deficit in the winter. Second, the geographic and 
environmental conditions (including water flows), and the pattern of demand in the project 
location are not specified. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain how representative the pilot 
project was to other locations, where conditions can be drastically different. The landscape 
of the country spans highlands and highland valleys with low population densities, to 
lowlands with more dense settlement areas. Thus, the magnitude, timing, and patterns of 
energy needs of people in different areas would be vastly different. In addition, it is not 
clear, even in the pilot project, that all energy needs – including heating, cooking, lighting, 
information and communication, and earning a living – would be satisfied with the 
provision of 1-3 kW of electricity per household, along with some energy efficiency 
measures. At minimum, an analysis of energy needs at the household and community levels 
is a necessary first step toward developing viable energy options.  
Other challenges to this proposal include relying on Barki Tojik as the system 
operator to purchase power from sHPPs. Acting as the single utility in charge of generation, 
transmission and distribution for the whole country (except GBAO region), Barki Tojik has 
faced difficulties in managing its activities along many fronts. A recent assessment of the 
company’s financial performance revealed several inconsistencies (Kochnakyan et al., 
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2013), as it incurred large cash deficits that crippled its ability to perform required system 
maintenance and ensure domestic power supply. The shortfall was due to high system 
losses, low rates of collecting of payment for energy bills, high overhead expenses and 
other unclassified costs. Barki Tojik failed to make any debt service payments in 2011-
2012, and by January 2013 had incurred $524 million in outstanding sovereign guaranteed 
debt, which accounted for 20% of Tajikistan’s total public debt. Furthermore, the company 
faced difficulties in paying for the power purchased from the independent power 
producers, such as Sangtuda-1 HPP, which produces about 15% of annual electricity in 
Tajikistan. The failure of Barki Tojik to pay Sangtuda-1 HPP $84.8 million resulted in their 
inability to pay $10.9 million in taxes, and a threat by the government to freeze the 
accounts of Sangtuda-1 HPP, followed by a rescheduling of payments (Interfax, 2013). The 
UNDP documents explicitly emphasize timely payments for the operation of the National 
Trust Fund for RES and EE. If Barki Tojik, acting as the system operator and power 
purchaser from sHPPs is unable to pay its dues in a timely manner, it is unlikely to be a 
good choice as a purchaser of power from sHPPs.  
Importantly, funding proposed by the UNDP for the RES and EE appear to be 
inadequate to meet the estimated costs of the plan. Namely, special charges for motor 
vehicles, imported vehicles, and a petroleum levy could reach about $334 million versus 
the expected cost of $162 million. This would mean that all the costs would be borne out by 
one sector of the economy. Apart from possible adverse impacts on mobility, reliance on a 
single source of financing is not in line with risk management practices. For example, 
fluctuations in prices of vehicles and gasoline would affect the demand for and supply of 
vehicles, and this would in turn translate into vulnerability for the RES sector.  
25 
 
In brief, the UNDP plan to improve energy access in rural areas through RES and EE 
initiatives presents a bottom-up approach to achieving energy security. Although the plan 
entails no major political concerns, its technical and economic foundations require further 
strengthening. Natural risk factors also need consideration.  
 
3.3. The Government of Tajikistan pathway: the Rogun Hydropower Project 
After two consecutive years of energy crisis during the winters of 2008 and 2009, 
Tajikistan resolved to capitalize on its massive hydropower potential. The hope was to 
secure sufficient power for domestic use and to increase electricity exports to foreign 
markets. With 317 billion kWh per year of economically feasible potential, utilization was 
estimated at around 5% (EDB, 2008). It is this untapped potential that formed the basis of 
the government plan with the promise of breaking the country out of the recurring cycle of 
winter energy shortages.  
In the government plan, the realization of Tajikistan’s hydropower potential is 
centered on the construction and rehabilitation of a series of hydropower plants. The 
centerpiece of this plan is the Rogun HPP, with a dam projected at 335 meters high and an 
installed capacity of 3,600 MW. Rogun HPP is expected to satisfy the domestic demand for 
electricity, and anticipated to generate surplus for export to neighboring countries. With an 
annual generation of 13.1 billion kWh, together with Sangtuda 1 and 2 HPPs, the overall 
generation in Tajikistan will reach 33.5 billion kWh. This will exceed the projected 
domestic demand, creating a surplus of about 10 billion kWh, which can be exported 
(Gulov, 2007, p. 23). Furthermore, Rogun HPP is designed like the existing Nurek HPP to 
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serve the dual purpose of electricity generation and water storage for irrigation. Hence, the 
flows out of the reservoir will be conditioned, ideally, to achieve both objectives. 
Although hydropower is alluring, along with the prospective benefits, large 
hydropower facilities are also accompanied by complex geo-political, social and 
environmental impacts. For example, there is a strong opposition by Uzbekistan – 
Tajikistan’s downstream neighbor – against construction of the Rogun HPP. Uzbekistan is 
concerned that the accumulation of water in the reservoir will lead to further lowering of 
the Aral Sea, which will exacerbate environmental problems in the region. Another possible 
source of concern is the potential for Tajikistan to turn off the tap and leave the large 
agricultural fields of Uzbekistan without water at any time. The estimated resulting loss 
from agriculture would be $600 million annually (Jalilov et al., 2011). 
In addition, there are tremendous social impacts associated with relocation and 
resettlement of the population from the inundation zone. Despite the attempts to make 
necessary provisions for resettlers, a news agency reported tens of thousands of people 
refusing to leave their place of residence (Ismonkulov, 2011), while some are dissatisfied 
with the compensation offered by authorities, claiming it does not reflect the market value 
of their property and is not a sufficient amount  to build a new house. Another group is 
opposed to the project because the reservoir is going to inundate graveyards where 
relatives are buried. Noting the absence of a resettlement plan and inadequate preparation 
by authorities in the resettlement project, Sodiqov (2009) observed that the situation of the 
newly resettled families  “resembles a spontaneous refugee camp” (p. 17), where people 
lack basic sanitary conditions and are uncertain when they would receive the materials to 
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build houses and move out of tents. Moreover, relocated people are not accustomed to a 
more humid and warmer climate, and are unfamiliar with cultivation of cotton, as opposed 
to their traditional agricultural practices crops of wheat and potatoes. 
In response to these concerns, and in an effort to facilitate informed decision-
making, the Government of Tajikistan, with financial backing from the World Bank, 
commissioned independent evaluations of the Rogun HPP in 2010. The evaluations, which 
span technical, economic, social and environmental aspects, were completed and final 
reports were disclosed in September 2014. The World Bank (2014) released a note 
highlighting key issues in the assessment reports, and called attention to further related 
concerns. Effectively, the assessments were positive and gave green light to construction of 
the Rogun HPP, with some suggested modifications. The position of Uzbekistan, 
nevertheless, remained unchanged. After the conclusion of the fifth and final round of 
riparian consultations in July 2014, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan officially 
stated that the findings were “completely unacceptable”, because Uzbekistan’s concerns 
over international safety considerations, transboundary water management and related 
socio-economic issues were not adequately addressed, and that “Uzbekistan never, and 
under no circumstances, will provide support to this project” (Azimov, 2014). 
Although estimates put the cost of the Rogun HPP from US$3-5 billion (Forss, 2014), 
or about half of Tajikistan’s annual GDP, the project is claimed to be a silver bullet solution 
that would resolve all energy shortages and also support the country’s economic 
development. However, facing a stalemate in bilateral relations and limited prospects for 
financing, the Government of Tajikistan is struggling to realize the Rogun HPP project. The 
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project has now taken a life of its own, elevated to the status of “symbol of the nation” and a 
“national idea” (Suyarkulova, 2014). In other words, tied to the project is massive political 
baggage that goes beyond economic and technical considerations.  
Nonetheless, in October 2016 the main riverbed of Vakhsh River was blocked to 
officially launch the construction of the Rogun dam that will be undertaken by an Italian 
construction conglomerate Salini Impregilo under a $3.9 billion contract (REF-RL, 2016). 
This development came after the death of the Uzbek president Islam Karimov in September 
2016 and neither the newly elected president Shavkat Mirziyoev, nor other government 
officials made public comments about the launch. Although a delegation from Uzbekistan 
visited Tajikistan in January 2016, it is unknown whether a shift in bilateral relations is 
underway.  
This state of uncertainty, coupled with aforementioned socio-economic and 
environmental concerns, confounds the prospects of materializing the anticipated gains 
from increased electricity generation. Therefore, multiple interacting issues need to be 
tackled – which require sophisticated technical expertise, mitigation of political and 
economic risks, and consideration of natural risks (e.g. Rogun depends on glacier water). 
In sum, mapping the three pathways against vulnerability factors shows that 
technical and economic prevail over natural and political considerations (Table 3). As 
discussed above, even the technical and economic aspects present additional challenges 
that are overlooked. This analysis provides evidence that the vulnerability framework helps 
to uncover the neglected aspects of energy policy. Granted, the dimensions approaches 
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could arrive at similar conclusions; however, they could not directly point to political 
factors, which is arguably the most critical ingredient of energy security deliberations.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
4. Energy services: an alternative pathway and policy paradigm  
The three proposals evaluated here present different sets of options for achieving 
energy security in Tajikistan. The action plan proposed by the World Bank study (Fields et 
al., 2013) emphasizes eliminating nationwide winter energy shortages; the UNDP 
(Bukarica et al., 2011; Morvaj et al., 2010a, 2010b) highlights alleviating energy poverty in 
rural areas; and the Government of Tajikistan’s Rogun HPP project aims at generating 
enough electricity to meet domestic demand and export surplus to neighboring countries. 
The World Bank and UNDP plans are intermediate-term strategies, focusing on energy 
efficiency measures and technologies other than large-scale hydropower by 2020. The 
Rogun HPP is more complex and costly, but is designed for the long term. All of these 
options can potentially meet winter energy requirements, but, only if substantial and 
sufficient funding is generated (Table 4). Furthermore, none of the proposals take the 
energy services approach in their analyses. 
[Table 4 here] 
Although they recognize that energy is needed for some purpose the three major 
plans do not fully address specific energy needs and uses of people. The World Bank 
proposal can be characterized as a conventional development approach to analyzing 
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energy security issues. It takes a stock of how much energy is produced, derives a demand 
function that shows a gap with supply, and proposes a set of technical and economic 
solutions to close the gap. The proposal does not engage in further detail on how much of 
the energy is used for different purposes, such as heating, cooking, lighting, information 
and communication, or productive uses. Neglecting the use patterns runs the risk of 
miscalculating actual energy needs and the type of energy required for each purpose.  
The UNDP proposal is closer to taking an energy services approach. With its focus on 
providing energy to rural households, the study discusses options to provide lighting and 
thermal comfort for homes (energy for households) and social buildings (energy for 
community services), as well as enabling some productive economic activity, such as 
operating small processing factories (energy for earning a living). However, it falls short of 
defining what is needed at the household and community level that could be addressed 
through some form of energy provision. 
The Rogun HPP proposal is a one-size-fits-all approach that ambitiously attempts to 
address all energy problems at once. Indeed, if successful, it may ultimately provide 
physical access to electricity that is more reliable. However, it is highly unlikely to be an 
affordable solution to rural people, which would present another type of barrier. 
Furthermore, electricity alone cannot provide for the diversity of energy services needed 
and desired by all people. In addition, it is uncertain when the project will start generating 
electricity and when reliable and efficient distribution will reach all areas of the country. In 
the meantime, energy shortages will continue to keep people in poverty and quality of daily 
life will remain unchanged, unless alternative solutions are seriously considered.  
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Assessment of energy security is incomplete, if not misguided, without first 
understanding the nature of energy needs and the forms of energy that could potentially 
meet those specific needs. Therefore, a rearrangement is required to place energy services 
at the center of analysis and redraw the implications for Tajikistan.  Such a shift in focus 
from energy sources to energy services can present an alternative approach to providing 
energy access in ways that also contribute to people’s energy security, as well as individual 
and community well-being. In this transition, the role of local people in achievement of a 
better quality of life through acquiring access to energy becomes critically important. 
Therefore, policymakers should prioritize energy services in order to effectively address 
the multifaceted challenges of poverty alleviation and energy security.  
To help guide this process, as Table 5 illustrates, a wide range of services from 
cooking to small business operations to industrial activities should first be differentiated 
and then addressed with appropriate technologies at each level and scale. There is a 
general misconception about the capacity of decentralized energy solutions; yet, evidence 
shows they do provide reliable and affordable service at a fraction of time and cost 
compared to grid extension (Practical Action, 2016). Rather than relegating them to the 
fringes of the grid, a concerted effort is required to integrate such technologies into the 
energy system. An important first step in this direction is to train staff in delivery of energy 
services using appropriate technologies for the energy, health, water, agriculture, and 
education sectors (Practical Action, 2016). Study tours to places where these technologies 
and approaches have been successfully implemented followed up with piloting as well as 
learning from existing experimental projects through rigorous measurement of outputs 
and outcomes, going beyond accounting for megawatts to “consider the numbers of jobs 
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created, agricultural productivity increased, children educated, patients served per 
megawatt, and so on” (Practical Action, 2016, p. 4) could be the basis for a shift towards a 
service oriented energy provision.  
Community participation in decision-making plays a key role in the success of 
development projects.  We suggest that energy development planners not only ask “energy 
security by which technology,” but “energy security for whom?” This reorientation of focus 
on service beneficiaries would require their involvement in energy planning and 
implementation. Rather than deciding at the national level what is appropriate for local 
communities, meaningful efforts should be made to understand the communities’ energy 
needs and assist with technical expertise and financial support to meet their needs. We 
endorse the recommendation of the Practical Action (2016) that “[t]hose living in energy 
poverty should no longer be on the periphery of energy programs steered by energy 
security, infrastructure expansion, and economic growth. Instead they should be at the 
heart of the agenda, driving planning and policy” (p. 4). In fact, for many emerging 
economies pay-as-you-go solar and micro-grids are considered a new class of 
infrastructure investment that improves local livelihoods (BNEF, 2017).  
In short, a change in policy paradigm towards energy services along with adoption 
of decentralized renewable energy solutions is taking shape globally, and it is prudent for 
the national energy planners in Tajikistan to learn from this process and make that change 
at home. Failure to do so risks keeping people in energy poverty and eclipsing their hopes 
for a better life.  
[Table 5 here] 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper applies the novel vulnerability approach advanced by Cherp et al. (2012) 
to assess the energy security situation in Tajikistan. This approach allows sufficient 
flexibility to identify existing challenges without sacrificing discussion of dimensions of 
energy security. With this in mind, we advance three conclusions, one related to the 
concept of energy security, and two related to policy. 
First, the vulnerability approach constitutes two key ingredients in its definition of 
energy security. It provides a concise and comprehensive framework to evaluate energy 
systems based on four major risk factors: natural, technical, political, and economic; and it 
specifically includes provision of energy services. The latter is usually implicit, if not 
overlooked, in conventional approaches, which primarily focus on energy sources (e.g. 
availability, affordability of supply). However, as Laldjebaev et al. (2016) illustrate, energy 
sources or forms are not necessarily mutually substitutable to deliver a certain energy 
service. For example, certain staple foods that are cooked on biomass are nearly impossible 
to replicate in electric stoves. Instead of labeling them as socio-technical barriers to 
transition to highly efficient forms of energy (e.g. electricity), socio-cultural and ecological 
relevance of energy use should be viewed through the lens of the services that people 
derive from different sources or forms of energy. This understanding of services, then, 
should be incorporated into energy security discussions on par with the understanding of 
the risk factors. It is this combination of the two elements – services and risk factors – that 
is unique about the vulnerability approach. Adopting this approach to energy security 
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assessment will help reveal the underlying causes of the problems, as we have tried to 
demonstrate in this paper.    
Second, attention to vital energy systems and services adds nuance and depth to the 
current discussion over energy security problems, plans, and pathways to Tajikistan. When 
applied specifically to the country’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities, our analysis 
reveals an intersection of threats including neglect of environmental conditions, lack of 
diversity in energy sources (overreliance on hydropower), shortfalls in production 
capacity, unreliable and expensive energy imports, crumbling and inefficient infrastructure, 
lack of transparency and accountability in energy provision, political stalemate in regional 
water and energy relations, and insufficient financial wherewithal to address the 
challenges. Although some of these vulnerabilities are recognized individually, their 
interactions are currently obscured or, worse, ignored in contemporary policy discussions.  
We maintain that cultural significance, ecological sustainability and suitability of 
technology for intended interventions should be given priority in addition to technical 
reliability, fuel costs, and pricing schemes (Laldjebaev et al., 2016). Community 
engagement and decision making is central to more progressive policy, and therefore, to 
eradicating poverty and achieving security – through provision of energy services. 
Third, although three options have been recently proposed to improve the energy 
security situation—labeled the World Bank pathway, the UNDP pathway, and the Rogun 
HPP pathway—each approach is inadequate in its own way.  A service-oriented plan is 
needed to provide energy access, and by doing so improve people’s wellbeing. The energy 
services approach offers a potentially relevant way to first understand the energy use 
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patterns, and then identify opportunities to effectively provide energy access. Capacity 
development of human capital at both the national and local levels is imperative to take 
advantage of decentralized renewable energy technologies. Following Practical Action’s 
work, we also recommend involvement of actors from private and non-governmental 
sectors to help proliferate the service-oriented approaches. Indeed, the small-scale 
technologies are showing great promise elsewhere in terms of lower cost, suitability, and 
quicker deployment to meet energy needs locally (BNEF, 2017). While development 
organizations can help introduce some of the technologies, civil society organizations can 
facilitate community participation in energy planning. Government support is further 
required to incentivize the private sector through subsidies and tax breaks when the latter 
import new technologies. Laws and regulations will also need to be developed to determine 
property rights, e.g. for land use to install community solar or wind farms. Given proximity 
to China, a global leader in both solar and wind technologies production, advantageous 
terms of trade could be negotiated for private sector to import these technologies. 
Furthermore, training of specialists could be arranged along with study tours in China to 
bolster the adoption of new approaches. The focus on households and community needs as 
well as involvement of the civil society and private sector actors is at the heart of the 
service-oriented energy provision. Therefore, we strongly recommend their incorporation 
into the national level energy planning and policy. In sum, energy planners should 
collaborate with communities, civil society, and private sector to tailor energy projects to 
user needs aimed at reducing vulnerabilities, eliminating energy poverty, and improving 
people’s livelihoods.  
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